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Abstract 
 
The Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM: Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000) holds that 
viewing former outgroup members as part of a larger shared ingroup can allow social 
categorisation to be harnessed for social cohesion.  Alternatively the Ingroup 
Projection Model (IPM: Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999) suggests that even where 
shared identification occurs, social divisions are sometimes transposed into common 
superordinate groups.  Here we explore the potentially inclusive national identity in a 
region (Northern Ireland) which has historically seen a high degree of polarisation of 
identities.  Using 3 data sets (N=2000; N=359; N=1179), we examine the extent to 
which a potential superordinate religiously inclusive national identity, ‘Northern 
Irish’, co-occurs with conciliatory attitudes towards the traditional outgroup.  Findings 
reveal that the relationship between the common identity of 'Northern Irish' and the 
exclusive religious categories of Protestant and Catholic is not straightforward.  
Individuals claiming a common ingroup identity display more positive social attitudes 
towards former outgroups, but their political preferences continue to reflect traditional 
divisions.  We suggest that our data are more consistent with the IPM than the CIIM.  
We conclude by considering the complexities of applying psychological models in the 
real world where structural and historical social divisions and vexing oppositional 
political questions can be transposed into new social and political orders.  
 Shared National Identification in Northern Ireland: the Veracity of Psychological 
Models of Group Inclusion Post Conflict  
 
Context of the studies 
Over the last decade in Northern Ireland, there has been an increase in the 
usage of the national identity label ‘Northern Irish’.  This presents an opportune 
chance to examine theoretical models which articulate a role for shared identity in 
improving intergroup relations.  This national identity label has been linked to post-
1998 Belfast Good Friday landscape in this formerly violent region (Muldoon, 
Schmid & Downes, 2009; Hayes & McAllister, 2009).  National identity labels in 
Northern Ireland had previously been polarized around 2 national identities over the 
course of the conflict: Protestants who identify as British and wish to remain part of 
the United Kingdom (UK), and Catholics who identify as Irish and wish to unify the 
island of Ireland.  In the 1968 Loyalty Survey (Rose, 1971), three quarters of Catholic 
respondents identified as being Irish, whilst responses among Protestant respondents 
were more diverse (British 39%, Ulster 32% and Irish 20%).  By the 1978 Northern 
Ireland Attitudes Survey (Moxon-Browne, 1983) however, the proportion of 
Protestant respondents claiming to be British rose from 39% in 1968 to 67%, 
reinforcing the religious/national dyads of Catholic/Irish and Protestant/British.  
These national identity choices can therefore be perceived as underpinning the 
opposing political positions held by the 2 main traditions in Northern Ireland. 
Intergroup conflicts most often arise where factors such as religion, 
nationality, race and ethnicity overlap to a high degree.  For instance it is common to 
hear reference to Israeli-Jews, Palestinian-Arabs, Irish-Catholics, and British-
Protestants despite the fact that, for example, not all Israelis are Jewish or all Irish are 
Catholic.  Whilst a small minority cross-categorise, endorsing an unexpected 
combination of national and religious identities such as British-Catholic or Irish-
Protestant (Fahey, Hayes & Sinnott, 2005; Hayes & McAllister, 2009; Muldoon, 
Trew, Todd, McLaughlin, & Rougier, 2007), the perceived correlation and inter-
changeability of the Catholic/Irish and British/Protestant identities has been widely 
demonstrated (Muldoon, McLaughlin & Trew, 2007; Lowe & Muldoon, 2010). 
This use of the Northern Irish national label and in particular its rise in 
popularity is therefore the subject of serious media and academic interest (Devenport, 
2012; Hayes & McAllister, 2009).  Northern Irish can be considered a common 
national identity for a significant proportion of Catholics and Protestants in Northern 
Ireland.  Though its adoption has been thought to be concentrated amongst the better 
educated and the young (Trew, 1998; Fahey et al., 2005), figures indicating the use of 
the label amongst approximately 1 in 4 adults (Hayes & McAllister, 2009; Muldoon, 
Trew, et al., 2007).  One way of thinking about this national identity is that it provides 
a common ingroup identity which transcends the extant ethno-religious social 
divisions (Trew, 1998).  The value of such shared identification for developing good 
relations between groups is widely accepted (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).  Equally the 
converse is often seen to be true: in situations of political violence, the struggle over 
territory, power and resources is often symbolised and represented in collective 
identities and these identities are seen to play a pivotal role in the conflict.  These 
identities are most often characterised as oppositional and negatively interdependent 
rather than being shared.  Indeed shared identification across traditionally opposing 
factions or superordinate identification with the Northern Irish group by both 
Catholics and Protestants may be an important vehicle for improving intergroup 
relations and promoting peace and reconciliation.  
On the other hand, questions remain as to whether this identity is a harbinger 
of peace and reconciliation.  Recent analyses of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement 
and its associated legislative Assembly structures in Stormont have suggested that 
these power structures have served to formalise religious-political divisions in 
Northern Ireland (McAuley & Tonge, 2007).  Furthermore, the Agreement itself is 
seen as driven by the elite and political classes rather than one resulting from a ground 
swell of public opinion forcing social change (MacGinty, Muldoon & Ferguson, 
2007).  A recent study by Hayes and McAllister (2009) examining national identity 
and social attitudes speaks directly to this issue.  Overall their analysis finds no 
evidence of a change in attitudes to mixed religion marriage, integrated schooling and 
residential segregation in Northern Ireland, although the increasing use of the 
Northern Irish label is associated with more positive views towards social integration.  
Similarly religious and national affiliations are perceived as being related to 
power and privilege.  Subsequent to the partition of Ireland in 1922 (into what is now 
Northern Ireland -a part of the United Kingdom- and the Irish Republic -an 
independent nation), those loyal to the British crown, largely Protestants, comprised 
the majority of the population.  Catholics, who at this stage largely viewed themselves 
as Irish, were frequently disadvantaged in terms of voting, housing, education and 
governance of the new Northern Ireland.  Whilst legislative reform has been 
introduced to good effect, this historical disadvantage lingers stubbornly and is 
reflected in (for example) higher levels of socio-economic disadvantage and 
unemployment amongst the Catholic population even though the Protestant 
population is no longer the substantive majority that it was (Hayes & McAllister, 
2001, 2009).  On the other hand, those of Protestant background view the Agreement, 
the increasing Catholic population together and some legislative reforms as both 
problematic and threatening (MacGinty & DuToit, 2007).  Their concern is that the 
pendulum may swing too far and instead of correcting an imbalance, these political 
and policy changes will marginalise Protestant interests. 
Contributions from the Social Identity Approach 
The stability and endurance of national allegiances in Northern Ireland and 
their resistance to change is unsurprising given the history of intergroup conflict 
(Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998).  To an extent the struggle over identity takes on a similar 
meaning to the struggle over power and/or resources in conflict situations, and as such 
it can be argued that collective identification plays a pivotal role in political conflict 
(Kelman, 2001).  Whilst social psychological approaches to intergroup relations have 
contributed much to understanding of conflict (Trew, 1996; Kelman, 1999), there is 
increasing acknowledgment of the need to account for more nebulous factors such as 
power, history and context in order to develop a full understanding of these intergroup 
processes (Bar-Tal, 2007; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999). 
This has led researchers in social psychology to consider the role that models 
of categorisation and identification may have in intergroup relations.  Gaertner and 
Dovidio’s (2000) Common Ingroup Identity Model (CIIM) recognises the central role 
of social categorisation in creating intergroup bias.  It suggests that identification with 
a superordinate group (a category such as the Northern Irish) can transcend existing 
boundaries, and reduce prejudice and discrimination.  Re-categorisation therefore 
allows traditionally opposing groups to adopt a superordinate identity (Gaertner & 
Dovidio, 2000; Nier et al., 2001) which then acts to promote social inclusio n. 
Social categorisation and internal representation of groups is at the heart of the 
CIIM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000).  Re-categorisation to include members of the 
former outgroup in a superordinate, more inclusive group, can be achieved by calling 
attention to superordinate group memberships (e.g., the Northern Irish category) or by 
introducing new factors such as agreed goals or common fate (e.g., as a peace 
agreement would).  In effect, a superordinate group representation reduces bias by 
extending group inclusiveness to former outgroups (in this case, allowing those of 
both religious backgrounds in Northern Ireland to share a Northern Irish identity), 
rather than through a process of de-categorisation (no longer being in a particular 
group).  This simultaneous or alternating salience of group membership that is 
possible within the CIIM model means that buying into a new Northern Irish identity, 
in the present example, does not require forsaking valued religious identities such as 
Catholic or Protestant.  The CIIM would predict that those categorising as Northern 
Irish would have more inclusive and tolerant attitudes. 
However, Hewstone (1996) suggests the CIIM approach may be limited in its 
applicability to real world contexts due to its reliance on data from primed lab 
settings.  An alternative to the CIIM, the Ingroup Projection Model (IPM: 
Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), emphasises the importance of historical, contextual 
and structural factors that relate to both superordinate and subordinate categorisations 
processes.  The IPM argues that the power relationships between 2 subordinate 
identity categories are crucial to understanding superordinate collective 
categorisation.  Mummendey, Wenzel and colleagues (e.g., Mummendey & Wenzel, 
1999; Wenzel, Mummendey & Waldzus, 2007) note that unequal power relations may 
lead to projection of the more powerful subordinate group identity onto the 
superordinate category.  For example, a study within post-reunification Germany of 
the subordinate categories 'East German' and 'West German' showed status differences 
between the 2 subgroups when considered under the common 'German' superordinate 
category.  These findings suggest that both East and West Germans agreed they were 
members of the superordinate category, but both rated West Germans as being more 
typically representative of the superordinate German category.  Furthermore, West 
Germans’ ratings of their own typicality were significantly higher than East 
Germans’.  The level of inclusion achieved by the superordinate identity was therefore 
compromised by the relative status of the subordinate East and West groups 
(Waldzus, Mummendey, Wenzel, & Boettcher, 2004).  In the current case, evidence 
of projection of the majority Protestant group identity onto the superordinate Northern 
Irish identity would be consistent with the IPM. 
Wenzel, Mummendey and Waldzus (2007) point to another potential case 
where superordinate identification may be problematic.  If 2 subordinate groups are in 
conflict over the potential superordinate group identity, it may be that more tolerant 
relationships between the subordinate groups are achieved by avoiding shared 
inclusion.  In this case, the benefits of a shared identity are negligible: feelings of 
empathy towards the other group because it is fundamentally similar to oneself, or the 
granting of basic, equal rights no longer flow from superordinate identification 
(Wenzel et al., 2007).  In this case, the Northern Irish identity should not be seen as a 
harbinger of an inclusive and shared future, but instead a new source of subordinate 
group conflict.  
The Present Paper  
This paper uses the CIIM and IPM (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Wenzel et al., 
2007, respectively) to try and understand the nature of the Northern Irish identity, a 
national identity increasingly evident in Northern Ireland subsequent to the Peace 
Agreement.  Our first aim then is to consider whether the Northern Irish identity is a 
superordinate identity including those from the traditionally opposed religious groups 
in Northern Ireland.  
CIIM and IPM articulate how shared identification can be a vehicle for social 
inclusion.  We consider whether a shared identity that has occurred spontaneously - 
the Northern Irish identity- is underpinned by relationships and processes as outlined 
by these psychological models.  This represents an important contribution to the 
existing literature; whilst acceptance of shared inclusion as a vehicle for reducing 
intergroup conflict and prejudice is commonplace in psychology, study of these 
processes in real world contexts is less common. 
To this end, the extent to which the Northern Irish identity co-occurs with 
more conciliatory social attitudes is examined by contrasting participants who claim 
the common ingroup 'Northern Irish' identity with participants who consider 
themselves traditional 'British' or 'Irish' categorisers.  CIIM and previous work (Hayes 
& McAllister, 2009) would predict more conciliatory attitudes amongst the Northern 
Irish identifiers.  Extending this work we examine not only social attitudes but also 
political attitudes.  If the Northern Irish identity operates as a common ingroup 
category it would be expected that Northern Irish participants perceive less threat 
from their religious outgroup and express greater support for the Belfast/Good Friday 
Agreement than respondents who prefer the Irish or British national labels. 
We then go on to examine some of the predictions of the IPM (Wenzel et al., 
2007).  Specifically this model suggests that prototypicality for the superordinate 
identity (the extent to which respondents believe they are typically Northern Irish) is 
an important determinant of attitudes and as such if prototypicality should co-vary 
with these attitudes in superordinate identifiers this would suggest support for the 
IPM.  Further higher perceived prototypicality amongst Protestants who categorise 
themselves as Northern Irish, (rather than Catholics who categorise as Northern Irish) 
as a consequence of their majority position is consistent with the IPM.  A second key 
prediction here is that subordinate (Catholic and Protestant) identities will relate to 
attitudes even in the superordinate Northern Irish group.  Further, IPM (Wenzel et al., 
2007) would suggest religious differences will be evident within the inclusive 
superordinate group, and that these differences will reflect structural and historical 
differentials within Northern Ireland.  In this case, this might include evidence of 
greater perceived threat amongst Northern Irish Catholics who have had greater 
experience of violence during the conflict (Hayes & McAllister, 2001; Muldoon et al., 
2009) and similarly greater support for the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement amongst 
Northern Irish Catholics than their Northern Irish Protestant counterparts, as the 
former have generally been viewed as having more to gain from the peace settlement 
(Hayes & McAllister, 2009). 
The data in this paper is drawn from 3 surveys.  The first 2 studies examine 
identity, experience of violence, social and political attitudes, and health in residents 
of Northern Ireland.  The first survey was conducted in 2005 and the second in 2008.  
Results from a third study are also reported.  This study was conducted in 2007 as part 
of the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey and further examines identity 




Participants.  A sample of 2000 participants comparable to the census profile 
of the population in Northern Ireland comprised the sample for this study.  In the total 
sample of 2000 respondents, 1496 self-categorised their nationality as being either 
British (N=1015), Irish (N=520) or Northern Irish (N=190), with 275 refusing or 
stating another identity.  Female participants comprised 58% of the final sample.  
There was no significant association between gender and preferred national identity, 
however respondents who categorised themselves as British (M= 49.8 years, SD 17.4) 
were significantly older, F=(1, 1722)17.1, p<.01, than those reported their nationality 
as Irish (M =45.6 years, SD 17.1) or Northern Irish (M = 44.4 years, SD. 17.1).  1501 
participants provided a self-categorisation as either Protestant or Catholic on the basis 
of community background (Protestant, N=849; Catholic, N=652; refused or stated 
another religious background, N= 499).  
Ethical approval was obtained from Queen's University Belfast.  Participants 
received an invitation describing the study, assuring the anonymity of responses, and 
providing contact details for the project researchers and for a counselling telephone 
helpline.  
Measures. 
Self-assigned national and religious identity.  Participants were asked to 
select their preferred nationality from a list of 'British', 'Irish', 'Northern Irish', 'Other', 
'Don't know' and 'Refuse'.  Religious background was assessed with the culturally 
relevant and widely used question in Northern Irish surveys 'What is your community 
background?’ Response options included 'Catholic', 'Protestant', 'Muslim', 'Jewish', 
'Don't know' and 'Refuse'.  
Prototypicality.  A single item measure of prototypicality was included 
because it considers the issue raised by Waldzus and colleagues (2004) that the 2 
subordinate groups comprising a superordinate category may consider their relative 
prototypicality in relation to the superordinate groups differently.  Participants were 
asked subsequent to self-categorising their own national identity ‘To what extent are 
you typically Irish/Northern Irish/British?’  Responses were given on a 5-point Likert 
scale from ‘Strongly untypical’ to ‘Strongly typical’. 
Threat.  Eight items asked about Perceived Threat in relation to community 
and national background, and were scored on a 5-point Likert scale from ‘Strongly 
Disagree’ to ‘Strongly Agree’.  Sample items included measures of symbolic and 
realistic threat such as 'I feel threatened if the political parties mainly representing 
Protestants/Catholics are in power in Northern Ireland' and 'When I see an Irish 
Tricolour/Union Jack flown in an area, I feel as though my Protestant/Catholic 
identity is under threat'.  Mean scores on the 8 items comprised the final scale 
measure.  Similar to previous research in this context since symbolic threats can often 
take on a more realistic component (e.g., Tausch, Hewstone, Kenworthy, Cairns, & 
Christ, 2007), our measures of realistic and symbolic threat were highly correlated 
forming a reliable scale (Cronbach’s α = .70).  Higher scores reflect greater intergroup 
threat perceptions. 
Support for the peace process.  Participants were asked to what extent they 
supported the Belfast Good Friday agreement on a 5-point Likert scale, from 
‘Strongly support it’ to ‘Strongly oppose it’.  This single item was included as an 
indicator of political attitudes and in particular willingness to support the peace 
process which remained controversial throughout the years of our data collection. 
Procedure.  The survey was carried out using computer-assisted telephone 
interviewing.  A random sample of household telephone numbers was drawn from 
domestic listings.  These numbers were matched with the relevant postal address and 
a letter was sent to selected households, explaining the nature and purpose of the 
study.  Each household was then contacted by telephone.  A quota control mechanism 
controlled the number of respondents by location based on adult population statistics 
from the most recent Census of Population (Office for National Statistics, 2001).  
Surveyors used the 'last-birthday' technique to randomise the selection of respondents 
included in the sample.  Fieldwork was carried out during 2005. 
Results 
Analysis 1a: The Common Ingroup.  As moderate but significant 
correlations existed between prototypicality and perceived threat (r=.09, p<.01) and 
support for the agreement (r=.14, p<.01), prototypicality was entered as a covariate in 
all analyses.  MANCOVAs were conducted to compare British, Irish and Northern 
Irish respondents on threat and support for the Agreement measures, F (2, 
1439)=165.0, p<.001) with prototypicality entered as a covariate.  In all instances, 
given the unequal sample sizes Pillai’s criterion was used to assess significance given 
its robustness in instances where there are unequal sample sizes in cells (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001)1.  The results are presented in Table 1. 
Preferred national identity related to perceived threat, F (1, 1442) = 17.1, 
p<.01, and support for the Agreement, F (1, 1442) =132, p<.001.  In support of IPM, 
prototypicality covaried with either threat F(1, 1442)=8.9, p<.001 and support for the 
agreement, F(1, 1442)=14.6, p<.001.  We used Tukey’s post-hoc tests to check for 
significant differences between sub-groups.  Though a conservative test for a priori 
predictions, our large sample sizes suggested caution in evaluation of significance.  
Tukey's HSD showed significant differences between British and Irish participants 
and between Irish and Northern Irish participants relative to threat and support for the 
Agreement.  Irish respondents perceived the highest level of threat.  Post-hoc tests 
                                                 
1  Entering age as a further covariate age into the analysis did not alter this pattern of results in study 1 
or the study 2.  Though not related to support for the Agreement (study 1 r=.03, p>.05; study 2 r=.06, 
p>.05), age was related to perceived threat (study 1 r=-.22, p<.01; study 2 r=-.15, p<.01 ) in both study 
1 and 2.  
 
controlling for prototypicality (Tukey's HSD) showed that Irish respondents had 
significantly higher support for the Agreement than both British and Northern Irish 
respondents and Northern Irish participants showed greater support than British 
respondents. 
Analysis 1b: Ingroup projection.  We subsequently conducted analyses 
attending to the religious background of each national category.  This analysis 
therefore considers whether the religious background (i.e., the subordinate category) 
was still a relevant category for those identifying with the superordinate national 
identity of Northern Irish.  Due to the low numbers of British Catholic and Irish 
Protestant respondents (<2%), this analysis compares 4 groups: Irish Catholics (N = 
434), British Protestants (N=703), Northern Irish Catholics (N=67) and Northern Irish 
Protestants (N=81).  Given that prototypicality is seen as central to identification with 
the superordinate category, these analyses were undertaken using perceived national 
prototypicality as a covariate.  No significant differences in national prototypicality 
between groups were apparent, F (2, 1263) =2.4, ns.  Higher support for the 
Agreement was associated with higher national prototypicality, F (1, 1443) = 14.6, 
p<.001. 
The findings mirror the results in the earlier analysis.  Perceived threat was 
significantly different across all 4 groups, with Irish Catholic scores remaining 
significantly higher than all other groups (F(3, 1256) = 14.18, p<0.001) and Northern 
Irish identifiers (Table 1) and Northern Irish Protestant (Table 2) identifiers in 
particular, showing the lowest level of perceived threat.  Prototypicality covaried with 
perceived threat (F (1, 1442) =8.9, p<.01), again supporting a central tenet of IPM.  
However, the findings relating to support for the Agreement evidence an interesting 
difference.  The differences between the Irish Catholic and British Protestants remain 
(F (3, 1231) = 114.48, p<0.001), and there are now differences evident within the 
superordinate Northern Irish group.  The Northern Irish Catholic and Northern Irish 
Protestant groups are significantly different from one another in terms of support for 
the Agreement as well as significantly different from their religious outgroup with 
traditional national allegiances.  Prototypicality did not covary with threat or support 
for agreement within the Northern Irish group. 
Discussion: Study 1 
We hypothesised using CIIM that those who self-identified as Northern Irish 
would perceive less threat from their religious outgroup and be more supportive of the 
Agreement than traditional British or Irish identifiers.  We did not find full support for 
these hypotheses.  Northern Irish identifiers did not perceive less threat from their 
outgroup than British identifiers.  And whilst the potential superordinate identifiers, 
the Northern Irish group are more accepting of the Agreement than the British group, 
the Irish group showed greatest support for the Agreement consistent with the 
historically high support for the Agreement in this group (Hayes & McAllister, 2001).  
Our subsequent analysis sought to examine evidence in support of the IPM.  
We found some evidence in support of this model in that religious group differences 
(that is differences associated with the subordinate identity) are readily apparent and 
persist in those who identify as Northern Irish (i.e., the superordinate category).  This 
persistence of difference within the potential superordinate identity resonates with the 
arguments put forward by proponents of the IPM (Wenzel et al., 2007) who claim that 
superordinate identities can have very different meanings for subordinate groups.  
Furthermore group prototypicality was related to threat and support for the Agreement 
as predicted by the IPM.  Importantly however there were no differences in 
prototypicality scores related to subordinate categorisation, as would be predicted by 
IPM, in those who identified with the Northern Irish label.  Evidence in support of the 
IPM model can be seen as partial. 
In short, our findings to this point suggest that within our common ingroup 
there is evidence of religious division.  In line with Mummendey and Wenzel's thesis, 
available evidence suggests a potential conflation between the Northern Irish label 
and either the majority Protestant religious group, or alternatively, between 2 separate 
potentially contested understandings of the Northern Ireland label.  A key difference 
between the label we are considering here, and national labels studied previously (for 
example ‘German’) is that the Northern Irish label has entered into usage more 
recently.  This relative novelty may explain in part why there are no religious 
differences in the levels of perceived prototypicality; both parties feel they can 
legitimately project ownership over the identity.  
Certainly, the higher levels of threat apparent in Irish and Northern Irish 
Catholics evident in this first study would seem to reflect historic differentials in 
Northern Ireland.  Historically, Catholics have been disadvantaged in terms of 
political power, access to employment and fatalities over the course of the conflict 
(Hayes & McAllister, 2003).  They remain the numerical minority and have suffered 
higher levels of casualties as a consequence of the violence.  Catholic unemployment 
and social disadvantage, despite considerable legislative efforts, has persisted over the 
course of the Troubles (Hayes & McAllister, 2003), however that is not to say that 
there is not Protestant disadvantage, Protestant casualties of the conflict or a sense of 
threat within this group (Schmid & Muldoon, in press).  The importance of controlling 
for power as a central aspect of intergroup relations is relevant to both the religious 
division and the conflict in Northern Ireland and limits our interpretation of these 
findings.  Study 2 addresses this issue more fully.  
Study 2 
Our second study aimed to replicate and extend Study 1.  There is strong 
evidence that experience of conflict is not distributed evenly or indeed randomly 
across the population (Muldoon & Lowe, 2012).  For example those most affected by 
political violence and war on a global scale tend to be the very poor (Muldoon, in 
press) and within nations those most likely to be exposed to conflict tend to be from 
the most economically deprived sections of society (Muldoon & Lowe, 2012).  
Equally those who assume the strongest identity positions are often those with the 
most experience of conflict garnering psychological strength and collective resource 
from their strong identities (Muldoon, Schmid & Downes, 2009).  
In Northern Ireland (as elsewhere) a central component of the political conflict 
has been economic.  It is for this reason it been argued that some have suggested that 
those most likely to embrace the Northern Irish label are those who have been least 
affected by the conflict, effectively the more affluent and powerful socio-economic 
groups (Trew, 1998).  A central question then is the viability of the common Northern 
Irish label in groups that have been most affected directly by the conflict as well as 
the indirect economic dimensions of the conflict.  The situation is further complicated 
by the fact that exposure to political violence has been related to religious affiliation 
(Hayes & McAllister, 2003).  Catholics have experienced more violence as a result of 
the conflict, and remain economically more deprived than their Protestant 
counterparts (Hayes & McAllister, 2003). 
Methods 
Sampling Procedures.  The current study considers the complexity of 
relationships in Northern Ireland in a stratified sample of matched Catholic and 
Protestant respondents (subordinate categories), attempting to control for the 
variability in experience of the conflict and socio-economic status2.  Three factors 
were considered in the sampling rationale: the levels of violence experienced during 
the Troubles, levels of urbanisation and levels of deprivation (further details of this 
sampling can be found in Lowe & Muldoon, 2010).  Interviewers used the 'last-
birthday' technique to select individual participants from households.  Fieldwork was 
conducted in 2008. 
Participants.  In the total sample of 359 respondents, 343 (of the 359 
respondents) provided a self-categorisation as either Protestant or Catholic on the 
basis of community background.  Due to the sampling procedure targeting wards with 
experience of conflict and as a consequence deprived wards, this study had a higher 
proportion of respondents from the Catholic community than Study 1.  Protestants 
(N=143) and Catholics (N=200) from high (Catholics 108; Protestants 57) and low 
experience areas (Catholics 92; Protestants 86) were represented within the sample 
and roughly equal proportions of men and women.  342 self-categorised their 
nationality as being either British (n=127), Irish (n=143) or Northern Irish (n=72), 
with 17 refusing or stating another identity with those who categorised themselves as 
British again tending to be older (M =49.7 years, SD 16.8) than Irish (M= 41.2 years, 
SD 16.4) or Northern Irish (M= 43.7 years, SD 15.1) respondents.  Female participants 
comprised 51% of the final sample. 
Ethical approval was obtained from the University of Limerick and Queen's 
University Belfast.  Participants were presented with a letter describing the study, 
                                                 
2 An independent main effect for area of residence (as a proxy for experience of violence) was related 
to support for the agreement, F=(1,184) 6.3, p<.05, and perceived threat from the outgroup, F=(1, 184) 
11.9, p<.05.  No interaction effects were observed, F(2, 183)= .3 and .7 respectively, n.  S.  The 
relationship between self reported experience of violence, as well as are of residence as a proxy 
measure of experience, with identification and attitudes is well considered in the literature (see Fay et 
al., 1999; Hayes and McAllister, 2003). 
assuring the anonymity of responses, and providing contact details for the project 
researchers and for Victim Support (a charity giving help to victims of the conflict).   
Measures.  The same measures were used as in Study 1, with the exception of 
support for the political process.  Given the time elapsed since the Belfast Good 
Friday Agreement, participants were instead asked to what extent they supported the 
political institution arising from the Agreement namely, the Stormont Assembly, on a 
5-point Likert scale from ‘Strongly support it’ to ‘Strongly oppose it’.  Cronbach’s 
alpha for the threat measure was .74. 
Results 
Analysis 2a: Common Ingroup 
To examine the contention that those with the superordinate Northern Irish 
identity had more inclusive attitudes, MANCOVAS were conducted to compare 
British, Irish and Northern Irish respondents on both measures, F=(2, 278, 3.1, p<.05).  
Pillai’s trace criterion was used to test significance of effects given the unequal 
sample sizes in our sub-groups (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  The results are 
presented in Table1.  No significant differences were found between groups on threat, 
F (2, 293) = .32, ns.  Significant differences were found between groups on support 
for the Stormont Assembly, F (2, 278) = 7.2, p< .01 and protyptypicality was not a 
significant covariate with either threat, F(1, 278)=2.4, ns,  or support for the 
assembly, F(1, 278)=1.9, ns.  Post-hoc tests (Tukey's HSD) showed that Irish and 
Northern Irish participants had significantly higher support for the Assembly than 
British respondents.   
Analysis 2b: Ingroup projection.  To test the IPM, MANCOVAs were 
subsequently undertaken breaking down the Northern Irish group by religious 
background so that Northern Irish Protestants (N = 35), Northern Irish Catholics (N = 
35) - along with British Protestants (n = 99) and Irish Catholics (N = 132) were 
compared.  As in Study 1, prototypicality was entered as a covariate and Pillai’s 
criterion used to test significance.  58 participants who did not self-categorise on 
either variable or who categorised as Irish Protestants or British Catholics were 
excluded from further analyses. 
Differences in perceived threat across groups were again not apparent, F (3, 
292) = 1.807, p=ns.  However the support for the Stormont Assembly was related to 
subordinate religious identification and with the difference evident in the Northern 
Irish group, F (3, 277) = 4.295, p<0.01.  There was no evidence of religious 
differences in prototypicality within the Northern Irish group.  This is counter to the 
predictions of IPM.  Perceived prototypicality was a significant covariate (F (2, 293) 
=3.56, p<.01).  The distinction seen in our first analysis between British and Northern 
Irish on this scale is again driven by the greater support shown for the Assembly by 
the Northern Irish Catholic group.  The Northern Irish Protestant group does not differ 
in terms of level of support for the Assembly when compared to the traditional British 
Protestant group.   
Discussion Study 2 
Support for the new political dispensation in Northern Ireland and the power-
sharing Agreement is highest amongst the Northern Irish group which is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the Northern Irish label is a common ingroup.  That said, 
religious (subordinate) differences within the potential superordinate (Northern Irish) 
identity are also evident which is in line with our hypothesis that religious 
identification continues to exert its effect with regard to political attitudes and in 
particular with regard to support for the Assembly (which arose from the Agreement) 
in the Northern Irish group.  Northern Irish Catholics are more like the Irish identifiers 
in terms of their support for the Assembly, than they are like Northern Irish 
Protestants, who have similar views to the British Protestants.  This suggests the 
ongoing importance of the religious identification within the superordinate or 
common national group.  Though this is consistent with the IPM, the failure to 
observe differences between Catholics and Protestants within the superordinate 
national group is not consistent with IPM  This difference remains in evidence even in 
this carefully matched sample that controls for experiences during the Troubles and 
economic power which are key determinants of these attitudes.  Importantly, the 
evident differences are in relation to political attitudes.  The findings of this study 
again serve to highlight the difficulties associated with applying our 2 models. 
A clear difference between these first 2 studies is the finding related to threat.  
In our first study, which was a random sample of the population, differences in 
perceived threat were apparent across the national and religious groups.  In our 
second, when contextual and historical factors such as conflict experience and 
deprivation are controlled, no significant differences in levels of perceived threat were 
apparent.  These findings point to the importance of contextual factors in shaping 
respondents’ perceptions of intergroup relations.  They are also consistent with recent 
experimental findings which suggest power can shape understandings of commonality 
and intergroup relations (Saguy, Tausch, Dovidio, & Pratto, 2009).  Our findings add 
significantly to both the CIIM and IPM literature by attending to power relations in 
this way.  Mummendey and Wenzel (1999) argue that subordinate differences within 
superordinate groups are largely related to power differentials.  Their absence in our 
matched sample that attempts to minimise these differentials between the groups in 
Northern Ireland supports the importance of these contextual factors and relative 
positions of power.  The difficulty of applying universal psychological models, 
whether IPM or CIIM or others to real world conflict situations that are by definition 
complex and highly context specific should not therefore be underestimated. 
Study 3 
These 2 analyses now suggest that within the Northern Irish group religious 
background is linked to differences in political attitudes.  In Studies 1 and 2, the 
relationship between the common national identity (Northern Irish) and social 
attitudes is less clear.  Study 1 showed somewhat reduced perceived threat by the 
Northern Irish participants compared to the British and Irish participants, but this was 
not replicated in Study 2, where experiences during the conflict and economic 
contexts were taken into account via sampling.  Whilst the more positive social 
attitudes of the superordinate Northern Irish identifiers may be taken as a positive 
signifier, they contrast with the persistent differences in political attitudes amongst 
Catholics and Protestants.  We hypothesise that the target of the attitude is central to 
understanding this issue and it is to this issue we turn in Study 3. 
Social targets are of less strategic importance than political targets which can 
be centrally concerned with the relative status position of the group.  Political targets 
may be more resistant to change because of their strategic importance, particularly in 
conflicted societies, where intergroup relations are often constructed as a zero sum 
game.  In this third study, we consider attitudes towards political targets separately 
from social targets.  To unpick this issue, Study 3 uses data from a third survey to 
compare a wider range of social and political attitudes across traditionally 
oppositional British and Irish groups and the superordinate Northern Irish group. 
This research was conducted as part of the 2007 Northern Ireland Life and 
Times Survey (NILT) involving 1179 face-to-face interviews with adults aged 18 
years or over.  One key difference between the items in Study 3 compared to Studies 1 
and 2 is that the items in the NILT involve categorical-choice responses from a series 
of attitude and behaviour statements, rather than the more traditional psychological 
scale data as used in Studies 1 and 2.  As a consequence, this categorical data has been 
analysed using, more appropriately, non-parametric statistics. 
Methods 
Sampling Procedure.  The NILT uses a systematic random sample of 
addresses was selected from the Land and Property Services Agency list of private 
addresses.  This is the most up-to-date listing of private households and is made 
available to the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency for research 
purposes.  People living in institutions (though not in private households in such 
institutions) are excluded. 
Participants.  In the total sample of 1179 respondents, 1033 self-categorised 
their nationality as being either British (N=460), Irish (N=330) or Northern Irish 
(N=302).  This survey included a fourth possible identity, Ulster, to which only a 
small group subscribed (N= 41) and 46 participants refused or gave an alternative 
national identity and so were excluded from further analyses.  Of the 1179 
respondents, 1009 indicated their religious affiliation as either Protestant (N=555) or 
Catholic (N=454).  Female participants comprised 53% of the final sample.   
Again, respondents were assigned initially to 3 groups of identity 
combinations for purposes of statistical analysis: Northern Irish (N= 252), British (N = 
346) and Irish (N = 276).  Respondents who categorised themselves as British (M= 
51.4 years, SD 18.6) were again significantly older than those reported their 
nationality as Irish (M= 47.7 years old, SD 18.9) or Northern Irish (M =46.4 years, SD 
16.9), there was no statistical difference between age in the Irish and Northern Irish 
respondents.  Subsequently the Northern Irish participants were subdivided by 
religious background: Protestants (N = 144) and Catholics (N = 108).  Participants 
with unexpected combinations and those who did not self-categorise on either 
dimension were excluded from further analyses. 
Measures 
Self-assigned national and religious identity.  As in Study 1, participants 
were asked to select their national and religious identity from a list of possible 
choices.   
Attitudes to social targets.  The NILT has questions relating to practical 
questions of living in Northern Ireland, and questions related to the political 
governance.  Three questions were chosen to reflect the level that participants 
supported integration of communities of different religious background in 3 areas of 
daily life: home, work and schooling.  The questions were: If you had a choice, would 
you prefer to live in a neighbourhood with people of your own religion, or mixed 
religion; If you were working and had to change your job, would you prefer a 
workplace with people of your own religion or mixed religion; If you were deciding 
where to send your children to school, would you prefer a school with children of 
your own religion only, or a mixed religion school.  Response options required 
indication of preference for a mixed or single religion setting for their neighbourhood, 
workplace and school. 
Attitudes to Political targets. Participants were asked about their preferred 
political future for Northern Ireland from the following list: remaining part of the UK 
under direct rule from Westminster, remaining part of the UK with devolved 
government in Northern Ireland, becoming part of the Republic of Ireland or an 
alternative solution of Northern Ireland being independent of both the UK and 
Republic of Ireland. 
Procedure.  The Land and Property Services Agency provides a good 
sampling frame of addresses, but contains no information about the number of people 
living at an address.  Further selection stages were therefore required to convert the 
listing of addresses to a listing of individuals from which one person was then 
selected.  The interviewers listed all members of the household eligible for inclusion 
in the sample: that is, all persons aged 18 or over living at the address.  From this 
listing of eligible adults, the interviewer's computer randomly selected one adult.  This 
person, the selected respondent, completed all questions using Computer Assisted 
Personal Interviewing (CAPITM).  Fieldwork was carried out between October 2007 
and January 2008. 
Results  
Attitudes to social targets.  There was a significant association between 
national identity and neighbourhood preference, Chi2, N=839) = 6.62, p<0.05, 
Cramer's V = 0.09.  The Northern Irish group (86% of all those preferring this national 
label) show a significantly greater preference for mixed-religion neighbourhoods than 
either of the British (81% of those preferring this label) or Irish (77% of those 
preferring this label) groups.  Table 3 also shows the proportion of each group who 
preferred a single or mixed-religion workplace.  Again there was a significant 
association between national identity and workplace preference, with the Northern 
Irish group showing significantly more preference for mixed religion workplaces 
(97.6% compared to 93.5% of British and 90% of Irish respondents), Chi (2, 
N=857) = 12.50, p<0.01, Cramer's V = 0.12.  Table 3 also shows the proportion of 
each group who stated a preference for mixed-religion schools.  There was a 
significant association between national identity and schooling preferences, Chi (2, 
N=838) = 42.31, p<0.001, Cramer's V = 0.23.  Again Northern Irish respondents 
showed significantly higher preference for mixed religion schools (74.5%) than Irish 
or British respondents (48.1% and 67.9% respectively). 
Preferences of the 2 religious groups for mixed religion neighbourhoods, 
workplaces and schools were also examined within the Northern Irish group.  No 
differences between Northern Irish Catholics and Protestants were evident in relation 
to preference for mixed religion workplaces and schools, Pearson Chi (3, N =839) = 
7.236, ns and Pearson Chi (3, N =857) = 2.540, ns respectively.  However, whilst 
the Northern Irish group show a greater preference for mixed-religion schooling 
generally Protestant support(83%) for mixed-schools is significantly higher than 
Catholic support (63%) even within the superordinate Northern Irish group, Chi (3, 
N=838) = 53.21, p<0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.25). 
Attitudes to political targets.  The political attitude question asked 
participants what the long-term policy for Northern Ireland should be, from a 
selection of 4 options (to remain part of the UK with direct rule from London, to 
remain part of the UK with devolved government, to become part of the Republic of 
Ireland or to become an independent state).  These results are presented in Table 4.  
When Northern Irish is considered as a unitary group, a Chi-square test indicated that 
there was a significant association between national identity and future political 
preference, Chi(6, N=825) = 3.63, p<0.001, Cramer's V = 0.47.   
The vast majority of British Protestants support continuing union with the UK, 
with only 1.2% supporting Northern Ireland to become part of the Republic of Ireland 
and 2.7% supporting an independent Northern Ireland.  Although the Irish Catholic 
results are less clear cut, the majority support Northern Ireland becoming part of the 
Republic (63.3%), with a significant minority (26.7%) supporting union with the UK 
under a system of devolved government.  Considering the Northern Irish group, they 
appear to reflect a midway point between these 2 positions with 74.7%supporting 
some form of continuing union with the UK and 17.2% supporting union with the 
Republic of Ireland.   
When the Northern Irish group were separated by religious background, this 
pattern remained significant, Chi (9, N=825) = 4.00, p<0.001, Cramer’s V = 0.40).  
However the Northern Irish group differs both from those with whom they share 
religion (British and Irish identifiers) and from other Northern Irish identifiers with 
whom they do not share religious affiliation.  For example 24.3% of British 
Protestants supported direct rule from the Westminster Parliament and 71.8% 
favouring devolved government, whilst the Northern Irish Protestant group shows 
little interest in direct rule from Westminster (7.2%) and greater support for devolved 
government (81.9%). 
On the other hand, almost 89.1% of the Northern Irish Protestants support 
continued union with the UK, and only 3.6% support union with the Republic of 
Ireland.  In comparison, the Northern Irish Catholic group show less support for 
options that involve remaining part of the UK than either Protestant group does, 
although they show greater support for this option than Irish Catholics do.  However, 
more than 10 times the proportion of Northern Irish Catholics supports the union with 
the Republic (36.8%) than Northern Irish Protestants (3.6%). 
Discussion: Study 3 
The findings of Study 3 extend the previous analyses; the moderation seen in 
the social attitudes of participants who identified themselves as 'Northern Irish' is seen 
in the greater preference for mixed settings in the neighbourhood, workplace and 
schooling.  However these choices still show differences dependent upon religious 
background, as particularly seen in the question regarding schooling.  This may be 
further complicated because the Catholic population in Northern Ireland attributes its 
success and burgeoning middle class power base to the Catholic educational 
infrastructure which predated the post-war UK welfare state.   
The preferred political future for Ireland shows that the clear majority of 
Protestant participants (whether citing either British or Northern Irish identity) wish to 
remain part of the UK, with most support for a form of devolved government.  There 
is greater variation between the Northern Irish and the Irish participants from a 
Catholic background, with the majority of Irish participants supporting Northern 
Ireland becoming part of the Republic of Ireland, and a majority of Northern Irish 
supporting devolved government.  However, there are clear differences between the 
preferences of the Northern Irish participants from the 2 backgrounds.  Whilst 81.9% 
of Northern Irish Protestants favoured devolved government within the UK, this 
figure was 47.4% of Northern Irish Catholics.  In contrast, 36.8% of Northern Irish 
Catholics supported Northern Ireland becoming part of the Republic of Ireland, in 
contrast to only 3.6% of Northern Irish Protestants.  The question regarding the 
political future of Northern Ireland therefore generates very different response 
patterns from the 2 Northern Irish groups.   
The 2 Protestant groups show almost zero-level support for Northern Ireland 
becoming part of the Republic, whilst there are high levels of support for this amongst 
all Catholic respondents.  Whilst the common national identity response of Northern 
Irish indicates greater social tolerance to the traditional religious outgroup, the 
religious background continues to be related to political attitudes. 
General Discussion 
Our studies attempt to examine the psychological drivers of a potential 
superordinate identity in post-conflict Northern Ireland.  We have attempted to 
understand this potential superordinate identity by applying 2 models from the 
psychological literature to 3 different large scale studies.  Our findings are not always 
clean or indeed unequivocal.  Indeed, our studies serve to highlight the difficulties 
associated with the application of these models to real world situations. 
The studies taken together suggest that the Northern Irish identity, a potential 
common ingroup identity within Northern Ireland, is related to moderation in social 
attitudes.  The category 'Northern Irish' is a shared label that potentially fulfils the 
requirements of the Common Ingroup Identity Model.  Individuals who identify as 
Northern Irish reject oppositional categories (Irish/British) and prefer the shared 
category (Northern Irish), and that shared category is associated with more prosocial 
attitudes towards the previous outgroup category. 
Our findings from Studies 1 and 2 examined participants’ perceived typicality 
relative to the national identity label that they had chosen.  Noor, Brown, Gonzalez, 
Manzi and Lewis (2008) in their study that assumed religious categorisations and 
assessed levels of identification with the Northern Irish label (irrespective of their 
national category preference) found evidence that Protestants may not sufficiently 
differentiate the content of the common ingroup identity from the content of their 
ingroup identity.  In our study, participants from a Catholic background who 
identified as Northern Irish did not rate themselves any less typical of the Northern 
Irish label than Protestant participants.  This suggests that the fit for Catholics and 
Protestants who select the Northern Irish category is equally good.  This finding can 
be taken as a positive indicator of the Northern Irish identity being inclusive of the 
traditionally opposing religious groups. 
The growth of a superordinate identity in post-conflict Northern Ireland at 
population level is a real life process; it has not appeared overnight (Muldoon, Trew, 
et al., 2007) therefore its growth, whilst positive, also needs to be understood more 
fully.  Our findings suggest its construction and meaning is different within the 2 
traditionally opposing subordinate religious groups.  Trew (1996) discusses the 
possible benefits of a Northern Irish national identity that supports positive social 
attitudes without having a direct consequence on the question of national 
determination.  The shared Northern Irish identity may support the day-to-day 
maintenance of relationships across the traditional religious divisions of the society 
within Northern Ireland (Trew, 1996).  Given our analysis, it is fair to say that this 
new identity is related to moderation of social, but not political, attitudes.  In effect 
the Northern Irish identity may be an identity vehicle that allows people to represent 
themselves as socially inclusive and tolerant without moderating their political 
attitudes.  For example our studies indicate even where the superordinate category 
label was applied, continuing distinctions within the group between subordinate 
groups reflective of historical power differentials, are evident.  Our concern here is 
that, in line with Mummendey and colleagues’ contention, superordinate identification 
can provide a basis for maintaining extant division.   
In Studies 1 and 2 however there is no observed difference in prototypicality 
of the Northern Irish identity for participants from Catholic and Protestant religious 
backgrounds.  This appears to contradict the IPM, as it predicts that majority 
subordinate groups will be considered as possessing greater typicality of the 
superordinate identity than minority groups.  In this case it would predict that 
participants from a Protestant background would consider themselves more typically 
Northern Irish than those from a Catholic background, as Protestants have principally 
been considered as the majority from both a numerical and power position in Northern 
Ireland (e.g., Waldzus et al., 2004).  However, the complexities of identity in this 
conflict illustrate why this perspective may be overly simplistic. 
Gallagher (1995) noted that the positioning of majority and minority groups in 
Northern Ireland depends centrally on the framing.  He suggests framings of 
nationhood that impact upon whether Northern Ireland is considered independently, as 
part of the UK, or as part of the Republic of Ireland.  From this perspective it is 
possible for both Protestant and Catholic groups to be considered a majority.  And the 
changing demographic profile, with a sizeable increase in the Catholic population and 
an older Protestant population, reflected here in our relationship between age and 
Britishness, adds to this ambivalence around majority group position (MacGinty & 
DuToit, 2007).  Furthermore Stevenson, Condor and Abell (2007) note the rhetorical 
value in claiming oneself to be in a minority position, with representatives of the 
Protestant community actively claiming disempowered minority status for strategic 
advantage (see also Gee, 1998, and Novick, 1999, for similar examples from the 
Arab/Israeli conflict).  The absence of prototypicality differences may therefore arise 
from the complex dynamic and strategic nature of identity in real world conflict 
situations.   
The political attitudes sections of each of the 3 studies point to this conundrum 
within the peace process of Northern Ireland.  There is no space within the political 
landscape of Northern Ireland to support those who want to remove themselves from 
the bipolar political arena.  If it is the case that individuals adopt a Northern Irish 
identity in order to distance themselves from the Irish/British dichotomy, this move is 
not supported by political options.  This is illustrated most clearly in Study 3 - the 
political attitudes question considers the most commonly discussed possible futures 
for Northern Ireland.  With the exception of independence, which has little support, 
each of the options can be aligned with the traditional national split of British or Irish.  
Our data therefore suggest that individuals who take on the potentially shared identity 
of Northern Irish continue to be thrust back into a more oppositional relationship by 
the enduring political division (see Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006 p.47 for discussion of 
voting in Northern Ireland). 
Our finding also runs counter to the common understandings of the category 
labels in Northern Ireland.  The conflict in Northern Ireland is ostensibly about the 
national sovereignty of the 6 counties of Northern Ireland and therefore it could be 
expected that the best indicator of political attitudes should be a participant's chosen 
national label.  Religious identity is more closely associated with social and cultural 
aspects of society and therefore should be expected to be more closely related to 
social attitudes.  However, the reverse is seen in the 3 studies here.  Of course, 
religion in Northern Ireland is an ascribed identity and the boundaries between groups 
are largely impermeable.  National identity in Northern Ireland is generally 
constructed as assumed (Stevenson & Muldoon, 2010) making the boundaries more 
permeable, therefore allowing greater social and political mobility. 
Conclusion 
Power, history and politics continue to resonate even amongst participants 
who select the common national ingroup category in Northern Ireland.  Our findings 
emphasise the importance of the attitudinal target under consideration.  When the 
questions asked are related to the bases of the conflict and social divide in Northern 
Ireland, then participants’ religious background influences their responses.  Indeed the 
importance of the context of the question is central in social identity research, again 
highlighting the strategic use of identities as political and rhetorical devices (Reicher 
& Hopkins, 2001).  The social identities and identity combinations in Northern 
Ireland, and probably in other real-life conflict situations, seem to be more complex 
than in ‘cooler’ intergroup situations.  Cognitive paradigms derived from the latter do 
not transpose easily. 
Whilst our studies have the advantage of being real world, this is also 
associated with a number of methodological implications.  In particular we would like 
to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that the datasets, though representative of the 
population in Northern Ireland, are limited by their reliance on self-report survey data. 
The entrenched nature of the political dispute, which has permeated most areas 
of society in Northern Ireland from the political elite to housing, schooling to sporting 
societies (Muldoon, 2004; Shirlow & Murtagh, 2006), works against any 
transformational potential of a common identity.  There are limited alternative 
directions available to take.  The current data also emphasises the problem associated 
with consociation agreements, like the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement driven by a 
political elite.  The question of the future sovereignty of Northern Ireland remains 
unresolved and whilst it can be side stepped in social interactions, it remains the 
divisive issue at the fore of the political life of Northern Ireland.  The dualist political 
landscape in Northern Ireland illustrates the difficulty of applying the CIIM to 
existing conflicts.  The apparatus of division in Northern Ireland society is not only 
psychological, but also structural.  Individual common categorisation runs up against 
bureaucratic structures that reinforce the traditional identities of Northern Ireland, 
including the compelling of the 'Northern Irish' to recategorise as members of these 
older (conflictual) categories.  The Northern Irish identity may well yet allow an 
alternative space for social interaction outside of the current dualist system of 
Northern Ireland politics particularly as the context changes and the salience of the 
older subordinate adversarial identities become reduced in everyday social and 
political interactions.  Its value as a vehicle for expressing inclusive political ideals 
though not yet to be evident is something that should be supported structurally and 
politically in post conflict Northern Ireland. 
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